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10 1. Complexifying simplicity
11 In a recent issue of Geoforum, Steven Manson (2001)
12 presented a timely review of Complexity Theory in order
13 to orient the unversed reader in a framework of Com-
14 plexity Theory’s key concepts. Manson begins with an
15 overview of the evolution of research in Complexity
16 Theory, appreciating its antecedents and asking a
17 number of thought provoking questions. This is fol-
18 lowed by a discussion that pulls together much of the
19 disjointed literature in establishing a typology of ap-
20 proaches to Complexity Theory, including an examina-
21 tion of their advantages and disadvantages.
22 In meeting the aims of his review of Complexity
23 Theory, Manson has covered a substantial amount of
24 literature, much of which is difficult to commensurate
25 and sometimes even contradictory. He effectively cuts
26 through its often effusive nature, uncovering some of the
27 embedded constructs and recognizing its links to the
28 past and its future potential. However this author con-
29 siders that Manson’s presentation of complexity did not
30 make clear a number of fundamental concepts in his
31 article. These points are to be taken up here through a
32 discussion of an alternative view in the context of
33 Complexity Theory: the first is a discussion of Manson’s
34 usage of ‘‘types of complexity theory’’, the second in-
35 volves a re-evaluation of the differences between these
36 ‘‘types’’, and the third addresses the differences between
37 Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory.
38 The second and third points of discussion are com-
39 mon misconceptions (in general and geographic litera-
40 ture) that arise from the assimilation of ideas without
41careful consideration of their context. This is a common
42problem resulting from geography’s borrowing tenden-
43cies (Agnew and Duncan, 1981). All of these points are
44essential to the conceptual framework that orients and
45directs the reader and researcher. An alternative
46framework is then considered in Section 5.
472. Theories of ‘‘Complexity’’ versus complexity theories
48There are many different forms of research efforts in
49complexity over many different disciplines producing
50many different measures and definitions of complexity
51that all fall under the rather broad umbrella of Com-
52plexity Theory (for a fairly comprehensive bibliography
53see http://aldebaran.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk/bruce/com-
54bib/). Manson (2001, p. 405) states ‘that there is no one
55identifiable complexity theory’, however that depends
56on the conception of theory. At the basic level of theo-
57retical construction, such as world-view (Moore, 1997),
58complexity theorists concur that the whole is greater
59than the sum of its parts. This aphorism appears to be
60the glue that binds the somewhat fragmentary nature of
61complexity research. Instead of considering algorithmic,
62deterministic, and aggregate complexity as separate
63types of Complexity Theory they can be thought of as
64different measures or definitions of the complexity of a
65system. Thus there are different theories of the definition
66of complexity rather than different types of Complexity
67Theory.
683. Complexity versus complicated
69Manson (2001, p. 406) recognizes that ‘there are
70separate kinds of complexity that have different and
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71 sometimes conflicting assumptions and conclusions’.
72 Beyond this recognition it is important to ask what are
73 the underlying constructs that make these ‘‘types’’, or
74 rather definitions of complexity, incommensurable. The
75 key to understanding most of the differences between the
76 varying definitions or measures of complexity is the
77 definition of the term complexity itself.
78 The difficulty with the term complexity is that it suf-
79 fers a semantic hangover from its well-accepted dictio-
80 nary definition; ‘only a decade ago, ‘‘complex’’ simply
81 meant made of many interrelated parts’ (Koch and
82 Laurent, 1999, p. 96), synonymous with complicated.
83 However, there is now much more to complexity than its
84 dictionary definition (Mikulecky, 1999). Many authors
85 have failed to note the difference between complicated
86 and the new interpretation of complex taken in Com-
87 plexity Theory.
88 A system is complicated if it can be given a complete
89 and accurate description in terms of its individual con-
90 stituents, no matter how many, such as a computer or
91 the process of programming a VCR (Cilliers, 1998);
92 ‘complication is a quantitative escalation of that which
93 is theoretically reducible’ (Chapman, 1985, p. 370). A
94 system is said to be complex when the whole cannot be
95 fully understood by analyzing its components (Cilliers,
96 1998). Many techniques under the banner of Complexity
97 Theory have little or nothing to do with complexity as
98 such, where the word complexity is used to describe
99 complicated or difficult systems, typically with many
100 parts (Edmonds, 1999). Chapman (1985, p. 370) asserts
101 that if the world can be explained in a reductionist
102 manner ‘then ‘‘complexity’’ is not qualitatively different
103 from ‘‘simplicity’’ but merely quantitatively different’.
104 Manson (2001, p. 406) states that ‘all three kinds of
105 complexity are concerned with how the nature of a
106 system may be characterized with reference to its con-
107 stituent parts in a non-reductionist manner’. However,
108 neither algorithmic nor deterministic complexity, as
109 Manson defines them, are complex in the sense de-
110 scribed above. Manson discusses two forms of algo-
111 rithmic complexity: the first is more commonly
112 described as computational complexity and the second
113 as algorithmic information theory. Neither formulation
114 of complexity is concerned with how the system may be
115 characterized by its parts in a non-reductionist manner.
116 Both translate complexity as complicated.
117 Manson’s unfortunate usage of deterministic com-
118 plexity as a classification of a group of types adds to the
119 confusion. Within the literature deterministic complex-
120 ity typically refers to those Manson has placed under the
121 rubric algorithmic complexity. What are commonly re-
122 ferred to as deterministic measures of complexity, are
123 those that require the accounting of every bit in an ob-
124 ject (Gell-Mann and Crutchfield, 2001).
125 What Manson terms aggregate complexity comes
126 nearer the mark of complexity that both Manson and
127this author consider apposite in terms of Complexity
128Theory. However, Manson’s discussion of aggregate
129complexity is a description of the structure and behavior
130of complex systems rather than a type of complexity.
131Manson’s explanation of change and evolution in Sub-
132section 4.1.6 is also somewhat confusing. The dissipative
133form of transition is a form of self-organized response
134by the system to perturbation. Self-organized criticality,
135rather than ‘the ability of complex systems to balance
136between randomness and stasis’ (Manson, 2001, p. 410),
137is that balance (commonly termed the edge of chaos)
138between chaos, which is not equivalent to randomness,
139and order. Furthermore, self-organized criticality is not
140a ‘‘type of transition’’ but a type of system organization.
1414. Chaos Theory versus Complexity Theory
142Because there is no framework or definition for
143Complexity Theory, or for that matter Chaos Theory,
144confusion between Complexity Theory and Chaos
145Theory or the concepts of complexity and chaos is an-
146other key difficulty overlooked by many authors. Be-
147cause Chaos Theory is in some respects a precursor of
148Complexity Theory, much of the terminology has re-
149mained unchanged despite changes in meaning. Manson
150recognizes that ‘deterministic complexity is [a]. . . marred
151concept’ (2001, p. 408), but does not expand as to why it
152is problematic. The differences between Chaos Theory
153and Complexity Theory are not discussed.
154Chaos Theory deals with simple, deterministic, non-
155linear, dynamic, closed systems. They are extremely
156sensitive to initial conditions resulting in an unpredict-
157able chaotic response to any minute initial difference or
158perturbation. Complexity Theory focuses on complex,
159non-linear, open systems. Complex systems respond to
160perturbation by self-organizing into emergent forms that
161cannot be predicted from an understanding of its parts.
162Mikulecky (1995) notes that the evidence for the va-
163lidity of chaotic dynamics for biological processes in-
164volve simple isolated systems. Chaos is found in the
165idealizations or models of real systems, but it is not
166evident in the systems themselves. Lorenz’s renowned
167weather system was an open but isolated system, a
168product of abstract computation that lies outside of the
169embedded nature of real world systems, incorporating a
170set of rules that did not change; ‘global weather is not a
171simple chaotic system’ (Bak, 1997, p. 159). Manson
172references Zimmer (1999) to state that ‘fewer systems
173than anticipated are in fact deterministically chaotic’
174(2001, p. 408). However on closer reading of Zimmer
175(1999), and with the difference between Complexity
176Theory and Chaos Theory in mind, it is evident that
177chaos has only been found in models, not natural sys-
178tems. In Chaos Theory disorder arises from simple or-
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179 dered states, in Complexity Theory large scale order
180 arises from complex apparent disorder at the local scale.
181 5. The importance of structure
182 Thus, much misunderstanding arises from the con-
183 fusion or inappropriate use of the terms of Complexity
184 Theory and Chaos Theory. This may sound like mere
185 semantics, but the importance of using appropriate
186 terms cannot be emphasized enough, as they form the
187 basis of communication. A well-defined set of terms
188 provides a framework within which research can be
189 placed and discussed.
190 Beyond confusion with complication and Chaos
191 Theory, this authors other comments have been directed
192 at the organization of the concepts of complexity in
193 Manson’s paper. The appropriate frameworks are very
194 important to developing a correct interpretation of
195 Complexity Theory. Frameworks form the next level of
196 theoretical construction (Moore, 1997) above the world-
197 view at which Complexity Theory seems to be stalling.
198 An alternative categorization of the varying types of
199 complexity found across numerous disciplines rallying
200 under Complexity’s banner involves a careful analysis of
201 their underlying definitions or measures of complexity
202 per se. This author considers that the types of com-
203 plexity may be divided into seven (not mutually exclu-
204 sive) groups, covering most of the main variations found
205 in the literature and which are briefly considered here.
1. Deterministic complexity. This type of complexity is
based on information theory and is measured as the
algorithmic content of a string of bits, defined as
‘the length of the shortest program that will cause a
standard universal computer to print out the string
of bits and then halt’ (Gell-Mann, 1995, p. 16). This
category also includes computational complexity, a
measure based on processing time. Thus complexity
is equated with randomness.
2. Statistical complexity. Statistical measures of com-
plexity attempt to measure the degree of structure
or pattern present in a complex system, circumvent-
ing the problem of statistical complexity where ran-
domness equals maximal complexity. The boundary
conditions of extreme order and disorder are satisfied
by vanishing at these limits (Feldman and Crutch-
field, 1997).
3. Phase transition. Maximal complexity is defined as
the mid-point between order and chaos, the edge of
chaos (Kauffman, 1995).
4. Chaos derivatives. The measures of complexity devel-
oped under Chaos Theory are typically based upon
the Lyapunov exponent or the Fractal dimension.
The former ‘defines in precise mathematical terms a
system’s sensitivity to initial conditions’ (Jensen,
1987, p. 177); the latter defines complexity through
a measure of the irregularity of an object.
5. Connectivity. Complexity is measured by the degree
of connectivity within the system, where the greater
the number of connections or interactions the higher
the complexity (Kauffman, 1995).
6. System variability. Complexity is defined whereby an
increase in system variability (e.g., spatial variability
or between scale variability) results in an increase in
the complexity of the system.
7. Relative and subjective complexity. These types of
complexity hold that it is a consequence of human
perception and is therefore relative to the observer;
‘the complexity of an object is in the eyes of the ob-
server’ (Klir and Folger, 1988, p. 193).
246Manson’s foray into describing the structure and
247behavior of complex systems can also be reformulated.
248The classification applied here is specifically oriented to
249geographic applications. As with the earlier framework,
250the divisions imposed are not mutually exclusive, they
251are used as a heuristic device to enhance understanding.
252Mapping complexity produces four classes: complex
253system structure, landscape, behavior, and organization.
254Complex system structure defines the complex system as
255composed of elements and relations or connections.
256Complex system landscape defines the state space of the
257complex system within which attractors are found and
258the importance of scale is recognized. Complex system
259behavior is defined by self-organization and can be di-
260vided into elemental behavior, or element $ element
261interaction, system $ environment behavior, and the
262complex whole behavior that emerges from the two for-
263mer types of behavior. Complex system organization is
264described as a continuum, the opposing extremes of
265which are defined as order and chaos. Between these two
266end points lies the edge of chaos.
2676. Concluding comments
268If a repetition of geography’s history of misapplied or
269poorly understood concepts mined from other fields is to
270be avoided and the potential of complexity to be clearly
271understood, it is imperative that these concepts or the-
272ories are critically defined in the terms of their origins.
273The dangers of accepting a single account of Complexity
274Theory without a thorough understanding of its original
275other disciplinary context will result in an inability to
276communicate effectively to those applying ‘‘complexity
277theory’’ in other disciplines and may well lead to spu-
278rious research.
279This returns the discussion to Manson’s insightful,
280yet unanswered, question: ‘What value does Complexity
281Theory hold for geographic research?’ (2001, p. 405), a
282question that supports the call for research from the US
283National Research Council (1997). To effectively eval-
GEOF 306
DISK / 30/3/02
No. of pages: 4
DTD 4.3.1/ SPS-N
ARTICLE IN PRESS
F. Reitsma / Geoforum xxx (2002) xxx–xxx 3
284 uate Complexity Theory’s value for geographic research,
285 and as a basis for future research and development, re-
286 quires appropriate frameworks.
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